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Abstract 
This paper examines why activity-based costing (ABC) and the balanced scorecard, two most 
significant accounting innovations in recent years, failed to be successfully implemented in a 
large tertiary education institution in New Zealand. The findings demonstrate that the 
implementation of both systems presented significant challenges. ABC failed because it was 
perceived to offer a low relative advantage, was highly complex, its implementation was not 
trialled, the benefits were not visible, and there was lack of communication, inadequate 
training and no change agent facilitating adoption.  The balanced scorecard failed because the 
institution was caught in a performance evaluation trap with bureaucratic compliance to 
government requirements preventing any real improvements, adoption was symbolic to give 
legitimacy but suffered from a lack of rationale or logic, and there was no real observable 
influence on performance improvements. The politically imposed measures with an emphasis 
on financial performance forced the institution to play the numbers game rather than deliver 
‘real’ performance. 
Keywords: accounting innovation, activity-based costing, balanced scorecard, public sector, 
tertiary institutions. 
Introduction 
Accounting innovation in the public sector is receiving increasing attention of many 
researchers (e.g. Jackson and Lapsley, 2003; Lapsley and Wright, 2004; Nasi and Steccolini, 
2008; Northcott and France, 2005; Olson, Humphrey and Guthrie, 2001; ter Bogt and van 
Helden, 2000; Ezzamel, Hyndman, Johnsen, and Lapsley).  This research adds to our 
understanding of the diffusion of accounting innovations in the public sector and more 
specifically in tertiary or higher education. Using the specific context of a large public 
tertiary institution in New Zealand, the study investigates why some innovations in 
accounting fail to get adopted or fail to achieve their intended objectives. Accounting 
innovation, in the context of this study, refers to accounting practices and changes that are 
perceived as new by users and organisations proposing its adoption (Rogers, 2003).  Activity 
based costing and the balanced scorecard has come to be regarded as the most significant 
accounting innovation in recent years (Cropper and Cook 2000, Northcott and France, 2005). 
This study examines why both these techniques have failed to be implemented successfully in 
the case study organisation. 
Extant literature recognises that accounting reforms in the public sector has its origins 
related to practices in the private sector (Hood 1991, 1995) and the decision to adopt 
innovative practices has largely been the result of government pressure to fundamentally 
transform public financial management and accountability systems (Lapsley and Wright, 
2004).  However, not all accounting changes get successfully implemented. There are 
material knowledge gaps relating to why some accounting innovations successfully diffuse 
whereas others fail to be adopted or achieve their intended organisational objectives 
(Christensen and Skaerbaek, 2007; Jackson and Lapsley, 2003; Naranjo-Gil, 2009; Nasi and 
Steccolini, 2008).   
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This study distinguishes itself from prior studies on diffusion of accounting 
innovation in the public sector in a number of ways. First, the empirical evidence is based on 
a longitudinal analysis that helps make a real assessment of accounting changes since users 
have had more time to learn about the reforms (Christensen and Skaerbaek, 2007). Second, 
the study of a large public tertiary institution provides a different context to most previous 
studies concentrated in central government (e.g. Ezzamel, et al., 2014, Arnaboldi, Azzone 
and Palermo, 2010; Perera, McKinnon and Harrison, 2003, and the health sector (e.g. 
Melletta, Marriott and Macniven, 2009; Northcott and France, 2005; Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 
2004). The diffusion of accounting innovations in public tertiary education institutions 
remain largely unexplored (Broad, Goddard, and Alberti, 2007). Third, instead of just relying 
on a single innovation, this study examines two most common accounting practices to help 
determine if adoption of both systems generates similar responses from users.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section continues with a 
review of literature. The literature review is followed by a discussion of the theoretical 
framework used in this study. The research setting and research method is outlined next, 
followed by the findings of the study. A discussion of the findings and some concluding 
comments are provided in the final two sections.   
 
 
Literature Review 
The diffusion of accounting techniques into the public sector has attracted the attention of 
many researchers (e.g. Ezzamel, et al., 2014; Cavalluzzoa & Ittner 2004; Jackson and 
Lapsley, 2003; Lapsley and Wright, 2004; Nasi and Steccolini, 2008; Northcott and France, 
2005; Olson, et al., 2001; ter Bogt and van Helden, 2000; Ezzamel, et al., 2014). Most studies 
note that the pressure to adopt or diffuse innovative accounting technologies in the public 
sector have arisen mainly from the need to provide cost-effective and efficient service and 
help improve overall financial performance and accountability. For example, Cavalluzzoa 
and Ittner (2004) reveal that considerable emphasis has been placed on implementation of 
new performance measurement systems that better support organizational objectives, provide 
a means to increase accountability and improve decision-making. Ezzamel et al. (2014) found 
that the introduction of Resource Accounting and Budgeting was initially sought as a 
mechanism to enhance democratic accountability. Cropper and Cook (2000) found that 
activity-based costing was most expected to achieve an improved awareness and 
understanding of costs and aid the decision-making process. Similarly, a study by Arnaboldi 
and Lapsley (2004) reveals that the adoption of activity-based costing in UK’s National 
Health Service was intended to facilitate the production of more precise costs to support the 
internal market of health care products.  
Jackson and Lapsley (2003) in their survey found that most common management 
accounting innovations are taking place in costing, budgeting and performance measurement. 
In costing, the activity-based costing technique has been recognised as the most significant 
costing innovation in recent years (Cropper and Cook 2000). Likewise, the balanced-
scorecard has come to be recognised as perhaps the most important recent accounting 
innovation that attempts to improve performance management, efficiency and accountability 
in the public sector (Northcott and France, 2005). Questions remain, however, about the 
appropriateness and usefulness of many accounting innovations (Christensen and Skaerbaek, 
2007; Jackson and Lapsley, 2003; Naranjo-Gil, 2009; Nasi and Steccolini, 2008). Prior 
research suggests that both the activity-based costing and the balanced scorecard has met 
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with only limited success (Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 2004; Cropper and Cook, 2000; Northcott 
and France, 2005). Top management commitment, decision making authority, training, and 
good information systems design has been emphasised as a pre-requisite for the successful 
implementation of these techniques (Cavalluzzoa and Ittner, 2004, Modell, 2004). According 
to Lapsley and Wright (2004, p. 359), “The single most important reason for accounting 
innovation in public sector organisations is statute, regulation or government pressure.” 
Arnaboldi and Lapsley (2004) found in their study that activity-based costing was a 
legitimating exercise, as the organisation was seeking to portray itself as modern. Broad, et 
al. (2007), in their study noted concerns over imposed measures and found that lack of 
formalised reporting systems, no chain of authority or ownership, a weak performance 
culture, gaming, and strategies without definable measures as common problems associated 
with ineffective performance measurement systems.   
Most studies have also shown that the reforms often produce unintended results and 
gaps exist between intended and actual changes. For example, in their study on accounting 
change in a number of governmental organizations, ter Bogt and van Helden (2000) found 
that a wide gap exists between the ideal concept of formal accounting change and its ultimate 
development, and between the newly-developed accounting instruments and their actual 
application. Olson et al. (2001) found that standardized accounting techniques transmitted 
from the private sector, though fashionable, was ineffective and accounting reforms in fact 
resulted in a weakening of managerial systems in the public sector. Nasi and Steccolini 
(2008) revealed that accounting reforms led to a reduction in accountability with little 
attention paid to the attainment of outcome and long-term goals and there was poor disclosure 
and communication mainly related to external reporting.  
Much of the accounting innovation in the public sector has origins related to practices 
in the private sector (Jackson and Lapsley, 2003; Lapsley and Wright, 2004). Indeed activity-
based costing and the balanced scorecard are among the most popular accounting innovations 
that emerged from the private sector. Some authors have raised concerns that private sector 
techniques and practices cannot be realistically transplanted to the complex public-sector 
context and still achieve the intended objectives (Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 2004; Nasi and 
Steccolini, 2008; Northcott and France, 2005). According to Nasi and Steccolini, (2008) it is 
important to consider the unavoidable differences between private and public sector 
organizations, among different types of public organizations, different countries and contexts. 
The fact that accounting tools have been successfully implemented in the private sector does 
not guarantee that they will be successfully implemented, and be useful, in the public sector 
(Northcott and France, 2005). There is also considerable concern that even though techniques 
have been around in the private sector for some time, little is known about the way in which 
these techniques are transmitted and diffuse throughout large and complex public sector 
organisations (Bjornenak, 1997; Lapsley and Wright, 2004). Our understanding of why some 
accounting innovations fail to be implemented or are transformed into something different 
from their stated aims is limited (Christensen and Skaerbaek, 2007; Naranjo-Gil, 2009).  
 
Theoretical Framework 
The diffusion of innovations theory (Rogers 2003) has been recognised as offering a useful 
framework for understanding the adoption of new techniques across and within organisations 
(Bjornenak, 1997; Ezzamel et al., 2014; Lapsley and Wright, 2004; Malmi, 1999; Perera, et 
al., 2003). According to this theory, diffusion and adoption of new technology is contingent 
upon the degree to which an idea is better than the idea it supersedes (relative advantage); the 
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degree to which an innovation is perceived as consistent with the existing values, past 
experiences, and needs of potential adopters (compatibility); the degree to which an 
innovation is perceived as relatively difficult to understand and use (complexity); the degree 
to which an innovation may be experimented with on a limited basis (trialability); and  the 
degree to which the results of an innovation are visible to others (observability) (Rogers, 
2003: 229-258). Innovation is more likely to be successfully adopted if it is perceived to offer 
greater relative advantage, have higher compatibility, trailability and observability, and lower 
complexity (Rogers, 2003). The inability to convey the merits of reforms can also lead to 
later implementation difficulties (Arnaboldi, et al., 2010). Other factors contributing to the 
full diffusion and routinisation of adopted innovations identified by Rogers (2003: 428-430) 
include: the extent of participation of organisational members in the innovation process; re-
invention, which provides a sense of ownership of the innovation; and the involvement of an 
innovation champion or change agent. 
While most adoption of new technologies are assumed to occur because of the 
potential benefits and efficiencies gained through implementation, Abrahamson (1991: 590) 
questioned this “model of (efficient) choice in which (internal organizational) adopters make 
independent, rational choices guided by goals of technical efficiency”. Abrahamson (1991) 
adds three further perspectives – forced selection, the fashion perspective and the fad 
perspective to the diffusion of innovation theory. Forced selection occurs when the motive of 
the adopter may not play a part in implementation because external organisations such as 
regulatory bodies, government agencies or one supplier who has influence over all interested 
parties dictate adoption of an innovation. The fashion perspective results when many 
potential adopters are implementing the technology because external parties such as 
management consultants are inducing organisations to adopt the latest technology. The fad 
perspective occurs when organisations adopt a technique in order to appear legitimate and 
retain competitive advantage, rather than for more rational reasons. Within the public sector, 
the government perceptions of what constitutes the optimal policy choice may lead to forced 
selection or induced adoption of accounting innovations (Jackson and Lapsley, 2003; Lapsley 
and Wright, 2004). While forced selection may be valuable to successful organisations, it 
may perpetuate poor performance in poorly performing organisations (Van de Ven, 1986). 
These perspectives are complemented by institutional theory that argues that public sector 
management reforms are not only influenced by economic and rational factors but essentially 
by a wish for legitimacy and an appearance of rationality and efficiency (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). Institutional theory posits three dominant forces that influence organisational 
decisions and strive for legitimacy: formal or informal exogenous pressures (coercive 
isomorphism); imitation (mimetic isomorphism); norms and standards of professional groups 
(normative isomorphism) (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
Perera et al. (2003) claim that the advantage of using Roger’s theoretical framework is 
that it explains adoption of innovation at the individual and/or group level within 
organisations. Gallivan (2001: 53) sees adoption as a two stage process – “a firm level 
decision to adopt the innovation (primary innovation), followed by actual implementation, 
which includes individual adoption by users (secondary adoption).” According to Gallivan 
(2001), secondary adoption is more crucial in explaining the adoption process because even if 
innovations are mandated at the primary organisational level, this does not ensure that 
innovations will be effectively implemented or used by target users. Literature has 
highlighted the importance of communication in the innovation process (Jackson and 
Lapsley, 2003; Midgley, Morrison and Roberts, 1992; Van de Ven, 1996). Jackson and 
Lapsley (2003) emphasise that good communications network with internal and external 
contacts are essential for new accounting innovations to be transmitted and diffused 
throughout large and complex public sector organisations. The theoretical concepts outlined 
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above have potential relevance to explaining why some accounting changes fail to be 
implemented or do not achieve their intended objectives, whereas other changes are 
successful and arguably develop into powerful tools.  
 
Research setting and method 
The research setting for this study is a large public tertiary education institution located in 
Auckland, New Zealand’s largest city. The name and type of the institution has been 
disguised as Institution XYZ to preserve the anonymity of the interviewees. In 2013, 
approximately 25,000 students were enrolled across three campuses. In addition to various 
undergraduate and post-graduate programmes, Institution XYZ also offers vocational and 
applied training programmes. The institution ranks in the top 10 public tertiary institutions in 
New Zealand measured by the size of student enrolment, government funding received and 
overall financial performance (TEC, 2012).  
Data for this study has been drawn from archival sources, participant observations, 
semi-structured interviews, informal conversations and literature reviews. Participant 
observations were made during the period 1996-2006 which covered the pre-implementation, 
implementation and post implementation stages of both activity-based costing and the 
balanced scorecard. This was also the period the researcher held a senior faculty management 
position in the institution which gave a unique advantage of “comparing the rhetoric of 
reform with the reality of experience” since “there has so far been very little, if any, 
systematic empirical research into practitioners’ experiences” (Norman and Gregory, 2003: 
35). To minimise researcher bias and help improve the trustworthiness of the data, this paper 
triangulates data from archival sources, interviews and a review of literature. Archival data 
sources include an extensive corpus of publicly available government documents, 
accompanying legislative frameworks, funding documents, tertiary institution’s strategic 
plans, minutes of meetings, budgets, financial information, annual reports, audit reports, 
internal communication and web-site documents.   
During the period 2007-2009, a total of 10 semi-structured interviews each between 
40-60 minutes were conducted. 7 interviews were held with senior managers and staff within 
the tertiary institution and 3 interviews was held with government officials. Interviews were 
tape recorded and transcribed and data analysis involved the identification of common themes 
that became an evidential base in determining the factors that contributed to the failure of the 
accounting reforms.  
 
Findings 
Prior to 1990, the management and funding of public tertiary institutions was largely under 
the control of the Department of Education, a central government agency. The Department of 
Education determined the funding levels and made payments of line-item expenditure which 
was described in a ministerial working party report  as “...highly centralized and 
interventionist... inhibits the speed at which the institutes/colleges can respond to new situations, and 
it limits their options” (Probine and Fargher, 1987, p. ii). Managers within tertiary institutions had 
little understanding of the origins of costs incurred by their departments and were not held 
accountable for performance. In 1990, the Education Amendment Act made major policy 
changes that revolutionised the funding of tertiary institutions with the introduction of bulk 
funding. The Act also made all tertiary institutions independent legal crown entities led by a 
chief executive and held accountable by individual charters which described the institution’s 
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role and long-term plans. Under the new bulk funding system,  public tertiary institution’s 
received formula-based funding determined by an analysis of institutional charter goals and 
statement of objectives, projected student enrolments, assessment of the current and previous 
years’ performance in achieving student enrolments and government’s tertiary education 
strategy. The bulk funding system imposed new managerial responsibilities which according 
to Coy et al. (1991, p. 92): 
 
“...should facilitate better strategic planning and management control, and greater public 
accountability and institutional responsiveness”.  
 
The new managerial responsibilities complemented with greater financial autonomy and 
decentralisation of decision-making led to developments in budget planning and control, 
costing/pricing and resource management. While most accounting developments were 
successfully implemented, activity-based costing and balanced scorecard implementation 
failed. The reasons for the failure are presented next.   
 
Activity-based costing 
Initially in the periods 1990 and 1991, Institution XYZ developed a conventional costing 
system that identified direct costs and made arbitrary allocations of indirect costs to courses 
and operating departments. Cost allocation became a necessary requirement to allocate 
indirect costs to outputs produced to complete the Statement of Cost of Services section of 
the financial statements. Cost allocation also became necessary to calculate unit cost per 
equivalent-full-time-student and the extent of surplus or cross-subsidies and fees to be 
charged to students. The cost allocation system was fairly basic, and used simple volume-
drivers such as student and staff numbers as the prime basis of overhead cost allocation. In 
1992, bulk funding rate reductions and the autonomy granted to the institution (all tertiary 
institutions as a matter of fact) to set tuition fees increased the value and relevance of costing 
information. Costing became important “based on its applicability to course development, 
budget preparation, efficient resource use and enhancing the institutions self-awareness by 
illuminating educational priorities” (Faculty Dean). The conventional costing system also 
developed as a powerful tool to complement the budgeting process, provide a means for 
controlling expenditure, monitor the efficiency of responsibility centres and measure the 
effectiveness of various programs.  
 
“...we derive and use cost information to serve different purposes...cost information is used in 
strategic planning... to judge our operational efficiency and make more informed decisions” 
(Management Accountant).     
 
As the tertiary education environment became more competitive by the mid-1990s, 
manager’s felt that costing information still lacked value in terms of the rapidly changing 
tertiary funding environment. Questions started to arise over allocated indirect costs 
(overheads) to outputs produced to calculate the full cost of services and unit cost information 
to help determine student fees and charges and the extent of cross-subsidies or surpluses 
arising from courses, programmes and activities. As overhead costs started to increase, there 
was a greater realisation by management of the complexity of overhead cost structures. In an 
internal memorandum (November, 1994) to senior management, the Finance Director raised 
“...the concern for greater accuracy and methods used to allocate costs to different courses, 
departments and faculties.”  
In 1995, the institution decided to adopt the activity-based costing (ABC) system. The 
Finance Director initiated and designed the system solely by himself. ABC was very new to 
many staff including accounting staff that had no prior experience and hence did not 
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participate in its design and implementation. According to the Finance Director, “a well 
designed activity-based costing system requires a fairly accurate identification of significant 
activities, activity drivers and estimation of resource consumption by activities and cost 
objects”. Since staff had basically no idea of the system and how it worked, they relied on the 
Finance Director to come up with the best system. So, without much consultation and 
assistance, the Finance Director designed the ABC system based on his understanding of 
activities, activity costs, cost objects and cost drivers and made monthly allocation of total 
overhead costs to faculties. Faculties became very concerned when they realised their share 
of overhead costs had significantly increased through the new ABC allocation system. They 
became very concerned about the effect the high overhead costs allocation was having on 
faculty’s profitability and through a subsequent reallocation, on school/department/course 
costs and pricing/fees. Some faculties that traditionally made substantial surpluses were now 
showing as making a loss. According to one Head of School, “my overhead costs became 
40% of my total school cost”. These concerns led to lot of opposition to activity-based 
costing and the planned secondary implementation of the ABC system at the 
school/department/course level did not succeed forcing the institution to cancel the project in 
1996 and continue with the conventional method of overhead allocation at the 
school/department/course level.  
A number of factors contributed to the failure of the ABC system. First, this became 
perceived as the Finance Director’s project and there were no change agents enrolled to assist 
with the implementation. Many managers and staff lacked knowledge and were confused 
about ABC and the purpose it served. According to the Finance Director, “From a 
managerial perspective, no one really understood that to bring costs down, resource 
consumption via their consumption of activities must be reduced”. He went on to say that 
“the institution has complex overhead cost structures that include such items as the cost of 
senior management, student administration, enrolments, library, computer services, lighting 
and heating, security services, cleaning and grounds maintenance that need to be allocated 
to different faculties” . The faculties, on the other hand, disputed their share of cost 
allocations. They felt that they were under considerable pressure to reduce academic costs to 
pay for higher overhead costs that kept increasing. These factors combined with unclear 
communication and inadequate training provided to users led to their loss of interest in the 
project. According to Head of School (2): 
 
“HODs did not show much interest...they did not understand overheads...and were 
not responsible for costs they could not control. ABC was not going to reduce 
overhead costs and it did not result in an improved understanding of the overhead 
costs or aid in decision making...we are not convinced that it served any useful 
purpose”.   
 
Some managers viewed ABC solely as an accounting department project that reflected 
fashion since the decision to adopt the system was taken hastily and largely influenced by a 
wish for legitimacy and appearance of efficiency. This was mainly because “the government 
and auditors had promoted its use” (Senior Management meeting notes, April, 1995). Within 
faculties and departments, there were concerns that ABC was not influenced by rational 
factors promoting increased transparency and accuracy in costing. By simply allocating costs, 
ABC failed to meet the expectations of internal users to help bring costs down.  
  
“Our allocated overhead costs are very high. With ABC, our overhead costs were not 
coming down, so we were not convinced that ABC was going to increase transparency 
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and help control our costs...rather it did a more systematic allocation of increasing 
overhead costs instead of lowering the overall costs” (Faculty Dean). 
A review of monthly finance meeting papers indicated a high level of frustration among 
managers regarding lack of consultation, training and details provided by the accounting team 
on how the actual activity-based allocations were made. Accounting department had limited 
knowledge of other department’s functions and was frustrated by the lack of participation 
from line managers to help refine the system. Apart from the Finance Director, no one else 
had any real experience with ABC. A review of ABC spreadsheets produced by the Finance 
Director revealed poor design of the model with some questionable cost drivers and activities 
that managers found hard to understand and act upon.  
 
“...the Finance Director produced spreadsheets with activity cost allocations that no 
one really understood...” (Faculty Dean 2) 
 
It became obvious that ABC did not change the mindset of the users since its benefits were 
not explored and communicated to the users. It also appeared that the Finance Director “gave 
up” with secondary implementation at the school/department level since the implementation 
costs outweighed the perceived benefits of the ABC system. So, it was business as usual with 
the reallocation using arbitrary basis of allocation of overheads at the faculty level. It was the 
failure to meet the expectations of users that led to the ultimate failure of the ABC project.    
 
 
Balanced scorecard 
The development of performance measures in public tertiary institutions commenced in 1989. 
The Ministry of Education required performance information to monitor the allocation and 
effective management of resources and to ensure that each institution’s obligations, goals and 
objectives as set out in their approved charter and strategic plans were met. The Education 
Amendment Act 1990 and the Public Finance Act 1989 made performance measurement and 
reporting a mandatory requirement via the annual reporting requirements to prepare the 
Statement of Objectives and the Statement of Service Performance. The Statement of 
Objectives required the specification of the mission, goals and objectives. The Statement of 
Service Performance required specific measures/targets and reports on the degree of 
achievements in both qualitative and quantitative terms.  Throughout the 1990s, financial and 
non-financial performance measures were developed by Institution XYZ, but this 
development was described by one senior manager as “piecemeal and dysfunctional.” The 
dysfunctional effect of performance measures was obvious as it encouraged staff to 
concentrate only on measures that were funded, rather than deliver real performance. For 
example, notes from a Faculty meeting (October 2000) revealed comments made by a Head 
of School that:  
 
“...since we get measured on student enrolments, we are encouraged to fill-up classes 
to make our performance look better and get more funding... we have not paid much 
attention to concerns relating to the quality of students we enrol...” 
 
These notes also revealed that manager’s “chose performance measures that were simple to 
measure and had funding implications”. A review of strategic plans, internal management 
reports and annual reports revealed that key performance measures used throughout the 
period 1990 to mid-2000 were equivalent full-time student enrolments, cost per equivalent 
full-time student, staff-student ratios and net operating surplus. In 2001, the Auditor-General 
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became concerned that stakeholders were not getting the best information on performance 
and commented that: 
 
“Development over the last decade has been uneven, with heavy emphasis on 
financial and output reporting, and too little emphasis on other areas – such as 
impact evaluation and outcome reporting” (The Audit Office, 2001, p. 3).  
 
Following suggestions and guidelines issued by the Auditor-General on ways to improve 
performance reporting in the public sector, in 2003, senior management decided to develop 
and implement a balanced scorecard. A project team led by the Planning Director was 
appointed by senior management to be responsible for the design and implementation of the 
balanced scorecard. The balanced scorecard framework was developed and implemented in 
2004 at the strategic management level. It was intended to provide a more integrated 
performance measurement system based on five perspectives – business results, stakeholders, 
internal processes, organisational development and environment.  The senior management 
also used the balanced scorecard framework in strategic planning (to set goals and objectives) 
and externally report on performance. However, actual implementation of the balanced 
scorecard in user departments (secondary adoption) failed.  
Essentially, inappropriate design and implementation difficulties contributed to the 
failure of the balance scorecard system. In terms of the design of the system, even though an 
attempt was made to reflect the organisations strategy, department managers and staff 
questioned the validity of many measures. 
  
“In fact there were too many measures and we saw no rationale or logic for many 
measures” (Head of School 2).    
 
Another Department Manager commented: 
 
“It seems that the performance measurement system was not designed for internal use 
but for external reporting to satisfy government mandate for improved performance 
reporting” 
 
A review of the institutions 2004 Annual Report revealed that of the 34 key performance 
measures, 16 mostly non-financial measures were reported as either not applicable or not 
achieved.  According to a Faculty Dean, “too many measures confused what our priorities 
were.” 
The balanced scorecard initiative also failed because of implementation difficulties 
arising from a lack of an integrated system to capture the performance data relating to too 
many measures. According to the Management Accountant: 
 
“Finance department provides financial performance data but we rely on individual 
departments to provide non-financial performance data and often departments do not 
have any system to access relevant data from diverse sources or it takes too long to 
access the data.”  
 
From the schools perspective, a Head of School commented: 
  
“We spent too much time gathering data to measure too many things but spent too 
little time acting on performance data gathered.” 
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 Another major factor that led to the failure of the balanced scorecard was that the 
institutional priorities kept changing to accommodate politically imposed measures and 
changes in government’s tertiary education strategy. For example, in 2004, government 
introduced three performance-based research funding measures of quality evaluation of staff, 
research degree completions and external research income as a strategy to increase research 
output and quality. From 2010, the government introduced course completion and student 
progression and retention rates as key educational performance measures that integrated with 
the tertiary funding system to ensure that tertiary institutions contributed to the government’s 
vision for the tertiary education system (TEC, 2013). With funding incentives attached to the 
research performance, research publications and external research funding became key 
measures of school and academic staff performance which according to a Faculty Dean, 
 
“...made people feel threatened and caused divisions among academic staff …some 
academics were mainly concerned about meeting their research outputs rather than 
improvements in teaching or course quality”.  
 
Some academics interpreted educational performance measures as pressure on them to pass 
students. One Head of School commented: 
  
“We have been forced to play the numbers game and instead of delivering real 
performance; we deliver student numbers that makes overall performance look good” 
 
A review of balanced scorecard measures revealed that the institution placed too 
much reliance on financial performance. This was mainly because of the strict monitoring of 
financial performance measures against benchmarks imposed by government. A review of 
strategic plans and financial reports revealed that net operating surplus, liquid assets, net cash 
flows, net working capital, debt ratio and quick ratios were the key financial performance 
measures against which the institution regularly reported. The institution felt threatened that 
failure to meet the financial performance benchmarks would place the institution under a 
strict performance monitoring regime of the Ministry of Education. According to information 
reported by the Ministry of Education: 
 
In 2010, “28 of the 31 institutions had an operating surplus (before abnormals) above 3 
percent of operating revenue – which is one of the Tertiary Education Commission's 
benchmarks for prudent financial performance, compared to 14 of 33 in 2005. Only one 
institution had an operating deficit (before abnormals), compared to nine in 2005” (Ministry 
of Education, 2012, p. 16).  
 
Institutional managers expressed concern that accounting had a narrow focus on costs and 
efficiency and that there was too much emphasis on profitability and solvency measures of 
performance and accountability. However, it was generally agreed that financial viability was 
an important element of performance.  
It became obvious from conversations with managers that where funding, rewards, 
and recognition and career progression was at stake, performance measures motivated 
behaviour of individuals to make performance look better than it actually was.  
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Discussion 
The findings of this study reveal that implementation of activity-based costing and the 
balanced scorecard represented the greatest challenge. There were a number of reasons why 
both systems failed to be implemented. With ABC, the Finance Director perceived a need for 
greater accuracy and methods used to allocate costs to faculties and proceeded to implement 
it without adequate support or assistance from change agents. ABC failed to meet the 
expectations of internal users to help bring costs down. Generally, staff lacked knowledge 
and were confused about the purpose served by ABC. Rather, its selection was more related 
to what the Finance Director saw as the right solution to greater accuracy in cost allocations. 
This finding confirms Armstrong’s (2002, p. 102) and Arnaboldi and Lapsley’s (2004, p. 2) 
contention that ABC has achieved its prominence because of statements of belief and that 
“people do not act according to the situation but according to their definition of it”. There 
was no shared vision among management about what ABC was intended to achieve. Many 
managers viewed ABC solely as an accounting department project and felt that the decision 
to adopt the system was taken hastily by the Finance Director. Using Rogers (2003) 
theoretical framework, ABC adoption failed because it was not perceived to be better than the 
traditional costing system, that is, it had a low relative advantage. This was mainly because it 
did not help bring down the costs; rather it resulted in an increase in allocated overhead costs 
since these costs kept increasing. ABC system also failed because it was difficult to 
understand and use (had high complexity), its implementation was not trialled and the 
benefits were not visible (Rogers, 2003). Because of its complexity in terms of identification 
of activities, activity drivers, and estimation of resource consumption by activities and cost 
objects, ABC was not designed and used properly.  
Arnaboldi and Lapsley’s (2004, p. 2) citing Jones and Dugdale (2002, p. 152), 
challenged the widespread adoption of ABC to the public sector, especially universities, on 
the grounds that it “did not capture the subtleties of the different kinds of changes which 
these organisations were experiencing”. While this seems to be valid observation, the 
subtleties of different kind of changes will only be captured if there a clear understanding of 
the changes and the exact manner in which management tools can be applied to deal with 
these changes. In the case of Institution XYZ, it seems that from a managerial perspective, no 
one really understood how ABC worked and could be applied to bring costs down.  
ABC also reflected Abrahamson’s (1991) fashion perspective and arguably served a 
legitimating purpose since the government and auditors promoted its use. Its primary 
adoption seemed to signal an appearance of efficiency through better cost management but in 
reality costs were not reduced. According to Abrahamson (1991), fashion, in the adoption of 
an innovation occurs when an organisation mimics ‘best practice’ technologies. While the 
Finance Director championed the adoption of ABC with a blind belief that this technology 
offered greater accuracy in costing, secondary adoption failed because its development was 
flawed and there was no change agent facilitating its adoption. ABC was not viewed as an 
efficient-choice model (Abrahamson, 1991). These factors combined with unclear 
communication and inadequate training led to the user’s loss of interest in the project. 
One of the most striking reasons why secondary implementation of the balanced 
scorecard failed was that the institution was caught in the ‘performance evaluation trap’ 
(Olson et al., 2001) and performance measurement was considered an end in itself. The 
balanced scorecard also lost its effectiveness since it was not designed for internal use but for 
external reporting to satisfy government mandate for improved performance reporting. This 
confirms the findings of Christensen and Skaerbaek (2007) that public sector performance 
reporting that emphasises external accountability may turn out differently from the official 
stated aims. Indeed, the balanced scorecard became a bureaucratic accountability reporting 
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mechanism and most of the non-financial reporting was largely commentaries designed to 
give legitimacy and avoid public scrutiny (Christensen and Skaerbaek, 2007).   
Kaplan and Norton (1992), stress that the key feature of a balanced scorecard is the 
use of a combination of financial and non-financial performance measures that help drive 
performance and ultimately achieve the organisational goals. Hence, the Kaplan and Norton 
have put strategy and vision at the centre of the scorecard emphasising the linkages and the 
cause and effect relationship between strategy and the measures. However, the performance 
measures developed by Institution XYZ were piecemeal, had no linkages with strategy and 
had a dysfunctional effect since it encouraged staff to concentrate only on measures that were 
funded, rather than deliver real performance. Broad et al. (2007), also found that the 
imposition of specific measures had dysfunctional effects on strategy since it was caused by 
the perceived need to improve performance against imposed targets, even though the 
organization did not necessarily wish to pursue such a strategy. In fact, Institution XYZ 
placed too much reliance on financial performance measures mainly because of the strict 
monitoring of financial performance by the government. This finding is contrary to Modell’s 
(2004) argument that the public sector may be moving away from a financial emphasis 
towards a multidimensional performance measurement model.  
The balanced scorecard implementation also failed because there were too many 
measures but no rationale or logic for many of these measures. There was no real observable 
influence of the balanced scorecard on management strategy and outcomes. Rather, it served 
a largely symbolic role. The institution pursued its financially oriented measures whilst 
paying symbolic attention to its non-financial measures. Hence, using Roger’s (2003) 
diffusion theory, the perceived relative advantage of the balanced scorecard performance 
measurement system was relatively low and reflective of the ‘fad’ perspective since it gave 
an appearance of rationality and legitimacy. The implementation difficulties compounded by 
a lack of an integrated system to capture the performance data arising from too many 
measures was another important reason for the failure of the balanced scorecard. This 
confirms Cavalluzzoa and Ittner’s (2004) finding that information system problems and 
difficulties selecting and interpreting appropriate performance measures play an important 
role in system implementation and use. 
Also, the institutional priorities kept changing as a result of changes in government’s 
tertiary education strategy. The politically imposed measures forced the institution to play the 
numbers game rather than deliver ‘real’ performance.  
 
Conclusion 
Accounting reforms have been central to the transformation of public tertiary institutions. Yet 
little is known about why some accounting reforms fail. Informed by the diffusion of 
innovations theory, this paper has addressed this research gap by examining the adoption, 
implementation and use of activity-based costing and the balanced scorecard in a large public 
tertiary education institution. Both initiatives failed to be fully implemented. The findings 
demonstrate that while primary adoption may be symbolic to legitimate organisational 
activities and improve public perception of accountability, secondary adoption is most likely 
to fail if the relative advantage of accounting changes perceived by internal users is low. 
Also, politically imposed accounting changes with performance-based funding implications 
may force a public sector organisation into a performance evaluation trap of bureaucratic 
compliance preventing any real improvements.  
By and large, accounting reforms are most likely to fail if it offers a low relative 
advantage, is highly complex, its implementation is not trialled, the benefits are not visible, 
and there is lack of communication, inadequate training and no champion or change agent 
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facilitating adoption. Adoption will also fail if it is merely symbolic to give legitimacy but 
suffers from a lack of rationale or logic and has no real observable influence on performance 
improvements.  
This study makes useful contributions to the research literature. It confirms and adds 
to prior research on diffusion of accounting innovations in public sector organisations and has 
addressed the lack of research into why some accounting reforms fail. Responding to prior 
research observations and limitations (Christensen and Skaerbaek, 2007; Naranjo-Gil, 2009), 
this study uses a longitudinal analysis and examines reforms that extend beyond the 
innovative stage of development in a large and complex public tertiary institution. This helps 
increase our understanding of common factors associated with the failure of these reforms. 
The findings of this study also have practical implications. It provides a valuable 
source of learning for institutional managers and public sector reformers. Managers who want 
to encourage the introduction of accounting innovations to improve organisation 
effectiveness need to avoid the pitfalls that impede implementation of accounting changes. 
Public sector reformers need to recognise that secondary adoption of government imposed 
reforms will most likely succeed if it is perceived to satisfy both the internal organisational as 
well as external purpose.  
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